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“An unusual voyage in far
northern waters”1
The Royal Canadian Navy’s first
postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950
Richard O. Mayne

Canadian War Museum 19980028-006

N

o one in Canada knew it was
there. The automatic weather
station set up on the shore of
northern Labrador by the German
submarine U-537 in October 1943
was undiscovered until 1981, when a
German researcher alerted Canadian
authorities. Yet the fact that the Royal
Canadian Navy (RCN) virtually
ignored the country’s Northern
littoral during the Second World
War was understandable. Despite
this single incursion into what at
the time was the British colony of
Newfoundland, Germany did not
have the technology to threaten
Canada’s North. This state of affairs
quickly changed in the immediate
postwar period.2 The emergence of
the Soviet Union as a threat to Western
security and the development of new
technologies, such as long-range
aircraft, made the Canadian Arctic a
potential frontline in a future conflict.
Opposite: The Royal Canadian Navy only
made it into the Arctic a few times prior
to the commissioning of HMCS Labrador
in 1954, and that creates a perception
it was not interested in this area in the
immediate postwar period. In reality,
northern operations were a focus of the
Navy from 1945 on and were limited
only by a paucity of available resources.

Abstract: Looking at the Royal
Canadian Navy’s operational
record between 1945 to 1950 it
would appear that one exercise,
two deployments, and a scientific
expedition in the Arctic was not the
type of commitment that matched the
growing strategic significance of this
area in the immediate postwar period.
Analysis of documents from this time,
however, shows that the RCN not only
was keen to explore the extreme and
unique challenges that this region
posed to naval operations, but also
that the navy was eager to protect
the nation’s interests in the Arctic.
This article, therefore, looks at early
RCN attitudes towards the Arctic as
well as the tactical and operational
factors that impacted these early
Northern forays. In doing so it argues
that it was government cutbacks and
limited resources that prevented them
from doing more.

At least that was the conclusion
drawn by the United States Navy
(USN) whose increased interest and
activity in the Arctic raised Canadian
concerns about sovereignty. This
created an awkward situation for
the RCN, which was caught between
a worried ally and a new adversary
who were both eyeing a region of
the nation in which Canadian forces
had little tactical or operational
experience.
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Important studies have
addressed the larger strategic
context of challenges to Canadian
sovereignty in the Arctic during
and immediately after the Second
World War.3 This article, by contrast,
focuses on the RCN’s activities in
the Arctic between 1946 and 1950
from a tactical and operational
perspective. It does so because this
approach yields important insights
into the RCN’s attitudes towards the
Arctic and the unique operational
challenges they faced in this region.
Indeed, the operational records
from this period (which show that
the RCN only initiated one exercise,
two northern deployments and a
scientific expedition4) suggest that
the Canadian Arctic was not only
“the sole domain of the USN,”
but also that the RCN failed to
represent the national interests in
the North prior to the commissioning
of HMCS Labrador, the Navy’s first
(and only) icebreaker, in 1954. 5
However, closer examination of
these documents reveals that after
1945 the Navy gave the Arctic a high
priority and stretched its extremely
limited resources as much as possible
to establish a presence there in spite
of the challenges posed by the great
distances and extreme environment.
35
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US Navy photos

There were two things that the
Americans had come to accept about
the Arctic in late 1945. The first
was that growing tensions with
their former Soviet partners would
increase the strategic significance
of the region, while the second was
that any defence preparations in
the Arctic would involve thorny
negotiations with their Canadian
allies. Certainly that was the
conclusion drawn by historian
George Stanley who observed that
the American government’s 1946
unilateral announcement of the
dispatch of a US Navy expedition
to Melville Island “had…the effect

of spurring Canada into a greater
watchfulness [and] activity in Arctic
development.” 6 In reality, this
supposed trigger to Canadian naval
involvement in the Arctic was never
pulled; this myth was the product
of erroneous assumptions made by
an over-anxious national media. 7
Not only did the Americans ask
permission to visit and establish a
weather station on the island, but
they also respected the fact that the
Canadian cabinet had deferred a
decision on whether to commit to this
venture until 1947.8
Although the significance of the
Melville Island incident has been

exaggerated, there is ample evidence
that Prime Minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King’s Liberal government
did not want Canada to be the spark
that ignited the simmering tensions
between the US and Soviet Union. In
fact, the government was willing to
go to considerable lengths to avoid
the appearance that it was siding too
closely with the Americans in Arctic
defence. Discussions in late 1945
regarding the joint Canadian ArmyRoyal Canadian Air Force Operation
Musk-Ox (a 3,100-mile trek from
Churchill, Manitoba, to Edmonton,
Alberta, to test equipment in cold
weather environments) provided a
good example of these sensitivities.
Suggestions that American observers
wear Canadian uniforms to conceal
their identities were viewed with
grave scepticism south of the border.
Similarly, the Canadian government’s
desire to publicize the mission as
“peaceful” and “purely scientific”
in nature brought the US Naval
Attaché in Ottawa to mockingly
observe that the Soviets were “not…
born yesterday” and were “not
swallowing this explanation.”9 The
Americans were right and King knew
it. King brooded in his diary that the
“Musk-Ox expedition,” had been
“folly” and had gone a long way to
increasing Soviet suspicions of the
West.10
The American desire to operate
in the Arctic only served to heighten
these Canadian fears. For instance,
the appropriately named Operation
Frostbite in early 1946 saw the large
attack carrier USS Midway sail into

The USS Midway, a large US fleet carrier,
participated in Operation Frostbite in
March 1946 which involved sailing
the carrier and its support vessels
into the icy waters of the Davis Strait
between Labrador and Greenland. Top:
The Midway passes through icy water.
Bottom: A Corsair on the deck of the
carrier needs to be cleared of ice and
snow before flying operations can
commence.
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Davis Strait to test the effect of cold
weather on air operations. While
the ships that carried out Frostbite
did not actually sail into Canadian
waters, those assigned to Operation
Nanook, also in 1946, did manage
to do so (this was the operation that
was originally going to establish the
Melville Island weather station).
Consisting of five warships and
one Coast Guard vessel, Nanook
was primarily a reconnaissance
and training exercise designed to
familiarise the USN with Arctic
conditions. Despite an invitation for
Canadian observers to participate,
King’s government remained
concerned about appearances.
Although giving their blessing for
Nanook, the government again asked
that any publicity surrounding the
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4

exercise be kept as “undramatic as
possible with emphasis on scientific
knowledge acquired rather than on
purely defence aspects.”
King was clearly nervous about
military activity in the Canadian
north, yet there is a well-told story in
an important popular history of the
Canadian Navy that the service only
took an interest in the region because
the prime minister was willing to
acquire a replacement aircraft carrier
for HMCS Warrior providing the
new vessel was “Arcticized.”11 Upon
closer examination, however, this
support for the Navy operating in
the North actually came from the new
defence minister, Brooke Claxton,
rather than King. The prime minister
remained unrelenting in his belief
that Canada’s northern policy should

be “primarily a civilian one,” and
while his government was willing
to co-operate with the Americans
in northern defence he privately
argued that “our best defence in
the Arctic was the Arctic itself” – a
rather naïve belief that inhospitable
conditions in the north were enough
to deter any aggressor.12 His thoughts
about replacing Warrior were even
more direct, as he confided to his
diary that the idea of procuring the
British carrier Magnificent made him
“shudder.”13
Claxton, moreover, did not
understand that “Arcticizing”
Magnificent was simply a term for
modifications that would allow
her to operate more comfortably
in the cold weather environment
of the North West Atlantic. The
37
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A strong sign of the RCN’s early resolve in the North: the new aircraft carrier, HMCS Magnificent (left), accompanies
two destroyers, HMCS Nootka (right) and HMCS Haida into Arctic latitudes during Northern Cruise 1948.

the general staff, was surprised that
this requirement and viewed the
Navy, however, was willing to use
the neither the RCN nor RCAF were
idea of borrowing and adapting an
this angle if it helped shore up the
putting proposals for Arctic exercises
American Tank Landing Ship (LST)
defence minister’s support for the
before the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
for this task as impractical. Although
acquisition of the carrier. But King’s
It was for that reason that Mann was
the concept of a Northern operation
attitude towards the Arctic was an
pushing an Army proposal involving
was highly desirable, the Naval Staff
obstacle. The chief of the naval staff
naval assets with the aim that it could
had no choice but to recommend that
(CNS), Vice-Admiral H.E. Reid, was
15
be useful to start “a ‘Navy baby.’”
the Army be told that the Navy was
already in trouble with King for
in no position to participate in this
openly criticising the deep budget
The concept itself was ambitious,
particular exercise.16
cuts that were making it extremely
calling for either a 4,700 or 10,000
difficult for the Navy to maintain its
ton naval headquarters ship to be
The rejection of the Army
current responsibilities in the Atlantic
“frozen in” so it could support a
proposal did not mean that the
and Pacific. 14 More to the point,
purely Canadian Arctic Expedition
Navy was bereft of its own ideas.
from 1 September 1947 to the end of
In fact, according to the assistant
Reid’s objection to the government’s
August 1948. Of course, the Navy
chief of the naval staff, Commodore
funding and manpower ceilings
did not have any ships that met
H.G. DeWolf, the Plans division
underscored a recurring theme that
had been “cooking up”
would haunt the RCN’s
various Arctic schemes that
efforts in the Arctic between
Horatio Nelson Lay and has famous uncle, Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King during the Second World War. In
were not entirely dissimilar
1946 and 1950; namely, that
the
postwar
years
Lay
played
a
pivotal
role
in
getting
the
RCN
to the one that the Army
they would have to respond
into the North.
had contemplated. Some
to the growing significance
within the Navy wanted
of the region with limited
to act independently of
resources.
the Americans, as in the
The fact that the RCN
Army’s proposal. This was
was struggling to meet
certainly the view held
its current commitment
by the director of naval
to two oceans led some to
plans and intelligence,
believe that the Navy was
Captain H.N. Lay, who
not interested in Arctic
had recorded that it was
defence. Certainly that was
inadvisable to approach
the impression formed by
the Americans about
the Army when the vice
converting a Tank Landing
chief of the general staff,
ship because it “would
Major-General Churchill
almost certainly mean the
Mann, wrote to the Navy on
USN would wish to be the
30 September 1946 advising
dominant partner in the
that his boss, the chief of
Library and Archives Canada PA 104221
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expedition, and I believe if Canada
is able to do it herself, she should do
so.” As the prime minister’s nephew,
Lay undoubtedly had the inside
track on King’s fears of aligning
too closely with the Americans,
possibly explaining why he saw a
unilateral approach as the Navy’s
best option. In the short-term, the
Naval Staff seemed to agree as plans
were hashed out to send the destroyer
HMCS Nootka on an “exploratory
expedition” to the Arctic sometime
over the summer of 1947.17
Commodore DeWolf, however,
had reservations about this approach.
Unconfirmed reports that a Russian
submarine was operating in the Davis

Strait only served to re-enforce the
notion that the RCN would have to
find ways to operate in the North,
yet DeWolf recognized that Canada
simply did not have the maritime
assets to patrol the region alone.18
From his perspective, the better
option was to participate with the
USN’s next northern deployment.
Even that, however, would be a
challenge as DeWolf confided to
Major-General Mann that the Navy
was “anxious to send a ship along
[with the Americans], if we can spare
one, but to do so we will certainly
stretch our resources.”19
The chances of the RCN joining
an American operation in 1947 were

slim, but not for the reasons that
DeWolf gave. Commodore Frank
Houghton was disappointed to learn
that the Americans were only sending
a token force of three ships on what
was essentially a supply mission.20
Moreover, while the Americans were
favourable to a Canadian ship sailing
with this miniature task force, they
did have some reservations about
the “suitability and practicability
of including light-hulled vessels,
such as destroyers, in a Force of this
kind.”21 It was a salient point. This
task force required an icebreaker
because it was operating at a time of
year when heavy ice was still present,
a circumstance that drove home the

DND Photo

DND Photo

Top: HMCS Magnificent, the RCN’s newest aircraft carrier, with Sea Fury aircraft on its flight deck while coming to anchor in
Northern waters; Bottom: HMCS Nootka (R96) refueling from HMCS Magnificent on the Northward journey from Halifax.
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reality that the RCN’s current ships
could only head north when ice
conditions were most favourable.
The impracticality of joining
the US Navy’s mission in 1947 was
good news for Lay’s plan for a
purely RCN northern cruise. Indeed,
because the Americans were not
planning anything on the same scale
as Operation Nanook, the Naval Staff
saw little value in a joint endeavour.
Capitalizing on the moment, Lay
immediately pushed his own agenda,
reminding the Naval Staff that no
RCN warships had ever entered
Hudson Strait or Bay and that “in
the light of the present interest in the
Canadian Arctic it is considered that
such a cruise would be of benefit to
the Canadian defence programme.”
The Naval Staff agreed, and with a
nationalistic fervour observed that
they were “of the firm opinion that
it would be preferable to undertake
a northern cruise under Canadian
auspices.” On 29 April 1947 the Naval
Board gave its blessing, and with that
the RCN had set a tight deadline for
its plan to embark on its first Arctic
foray. 22
The RCN clearly understood the
growing importance of the Arctic
as well as the urgent need to show
the flag there, but they also realized
that this pioneering excursion would
pose new logistical and operational
challenges. Planning for Operation
Iceworm, which was the codename
for the proposed Cruise, clearly
bears this out. The concept itself
was simple: the destroyers HMCS
Nootka and Micmac would embark
on a five to six week northern
familiarization deployment to
conduct radio communication tests,
Top: RCN personnel involved in a
Northern deployment get a good sense
of exactly how far away they are from
their home port of Halifax while visiting
Padloping Island; Bottom: Sailors from
HMCS Swansea, possibly on Padloping
Island, meeting with members of the
local community.
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refuelling vessel. Each method had its
drawbacks. For instance, the Dundalk
had neither a gyroscopic compass
nor radar, both of which were
essential for the extreme navigational
challenges in the iceberg-infested,
magnetically confused North.
Nevertheless, this latter option - in
conjunction with a decision to send
only a single destroyer (Nootka) – still
seemed the better one. The expense
of transporting naval fuel via rail to
Churchill and St. John’s was just too
high. Worse yet, even after refuelling
at St. John’s, Nootka would have only
25 percent fuel left in reserve by the

have established its presence in the
country’s own Arctic waters in the
summer of 1947. Although a letter
from Houghton to an American
admiral makes it clear that it was
Claxton who cancelled the cruise, it
is uncertain why he did so.26
Despite this setback, the RCN was
undeterred. In addition to forwarding
a submission for the acquisition a
Canadian naval icebreaker to the
defence minister, the Naval Board, at
its 25 February 1948 meeting, declared
the intention to dispatch HMC Ships
on northern cruises during ice free
periods.27 The Naval Staff also took

DND Photo

bathythermographic exploration,
hydrographic and magnetic
observations.23 Defining the mission
was the easy part; the complications
soon followed. Indeed, just as the
Americans had warned, the window
of opportunity for operating lightly
constructed destroyers in the North
was small as ice conditions dictated
that the cruise would have to arrive
before mid-August and leave no later
than mid-September. But by far the
greatest obstacle facing the planning
staff was one that would haunt all the
RCN’s Arctic ambitions, and that was
the issue of fuel.

A great sea level view of Haida, Nootka and Magnificent on their transit North.

The intended passage, from
Halifax to Churchill, Manitoba,
on Hudson’s Bay and back, was a
distance of some 4,800 miles, required
the destroyers to refuel. However
the two points where this could
occur, St. John’s, Newfoundland,
and Churchill, either did not have
the suitable type of fuel or sufficient
quantities of it. There were two
possible solutions to this problem. The
first was to use tank cars to transport
fuel to St. John’s and Churchill, while
the second was to give the soonto-be mothballed Canadian Naval
Auxiliary Vessel Dundalk a temporary
reprieve by turning her into an Arctic
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4

time she reached Churchill, leaving
no margin for exercises or diversions
en route.24
Fuel was a thorny issue for other
reasons as well. Getting a single
destroyer to Churchill and back was
going to consume a considerable
amount of the RCN’s yearly
operational allowance. This was
particularly problematic since the
government’s cuts had just forced the
Navy to reduce that appropriation
by 25 percent. 25 Nevertheless, the
Northern Cruise obviously had
momentum, and had it not been
for the intervention by the defence
minister, Claxton, the RCN would

advantage of the time provided by
Iceworm’s cancellation to plan a
new and far more ambitious cruise
scheduled for 2–28 September 1948.
Although the aims would remain
the same as Iceworm, the forces
assigned were considerably larger.
Along with the destroyer Nootka, the
RCN was now planning to send her
sister ship Haida, as well as the new
aircraft carrier HMCS Magnificent.28
Because the minister’s support for the
acquisition of Magnificent had been
partly contingent on her ability to
operate in cold weather environments
this deployment so early in her career
was smart politics even if she was
41
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A good example of the distances that RCN ships had to travel to reach Canada’s arctic waters exposing why fuel was always a
concern on round trips from Halifax.

not going to participate in the full
voyage. Instead, Magnificent would
conduct air operations with the RCAF
while sailing with the destroyers up
the Labrador coast to Wakeham Bay.
After topping up the destroyer’s
fuel, Magnificent would head back
to Halifax, while Nootka and Haida
would make a stop at Erik Cove before
continuing on to Churchill through
Hudson Strait and Bay. On the return
voyage the destroyers, having fuelled
in Churchill, would sail to Coral
Harbour on Southampton Island
followed by Port Burwell where
Dundalk would be waiting with one
last consignment of fuel.29
The fear of running out of fuel
and stranding a destroyer in northern
waters was still a dominant anxiety,
explaining why the Navy was now
willing to employ both the tank car
and Dundalk methods of refuelling
that had been explored for Iceworm.
42 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013
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There were other risks as well.
Dundalk in particular was vulnerable.
There was no time to install radar,
and that left some officers worried
about her operating off the often
foggy and ice-packed Labrador coast
with inadequate charts.30 The fact
that Captain A.H. Storrs was about
to replace Captain H.F. Pullen as
the commanding officer of Nootka
was also a point of concern for
the flag officer Atlantic Coast who
considered it “unfair…to have him
make his first voyage…in these
poorly charted waters.” 31 While
Naval Service Headquarters saw
this as overly cautious and even
suspected that Pullen was lobbying
to extend his command for the
trip, they were in the process of
exploring other precautions, such as
additional shackles for potentially
deep anchorages, propeller guards,
as well as assigning specialized

personnel to the cruise. They also
examined the possibility of acquiring
25-foot motorboat cutters equipped
with echo sounders that would scout
out areas for the destroyers where
depth information was scanty.32
Although careful planning and
preparations resulted in a cruise
that was a tremendous success there
were disappointments. The Navy had
already admitted that Magnificent’s
part in the exercise was “a small one,”
but inclement weather ensured that
her role was diminished further.33
This particular aspect of the voyage
was a setback, especially since Navy
and Air Force planners had gone
to such lengths to produce creative
war scenarios. Situations where
Magnificent’s aircraft would have
covered a fictional wartime Hudson
Bay-bound convoy, or conducted
reconnaissance missions looking
for enemy refuelling depots, would
9
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have provided invaluable training.34
Instead, Magnificent’s single day of
flying was spent with her fighters
countering enemy reconnaissance
flights staged by a RCAF Avro
Lancaster and Consolidated Canso.
Much was learned from these
shadowing exercises, but the true
significance of Magnificent’s presence
was that the RCN had shown its
resolve to send its most valuable
asset into the Arctic.35 It was a brief,
but shinning, moment as Magnificent
would never again sail this far north
in North American waters.
This cruise was undoubtedly the
high point of the RCN’s involvement
in the Arctic in the late 1940s, the more
so since the rest of the deployment
went so well. Much intelligence was
gleaned, equipment successfully
tested and invaluable scientific data
gathered, but the cruise was also
a success for a number of other
reasons. Both Nootka and Haida
reported that they experienced no
major difficulties with navigation
and found summer operations in
the region similar to the western
north Atlantic in iceberg season.
Future cruises were nonetheless
recommended because of the limited
area covered as well as the fact that
the terrain and atmosphere were so
different, a point that was illustrated
by the unusually deep anchorage of
40 fathoms in Wakeham Bay. The
deployment was also popular with
the crew and offered the Navy a
good public relations opportunity
in Churchill as well as the smaller
communities that were visited. As
was anticipated, ice and fuel were
the only serious concerns during the
cruise; small growlers and “bergy
bits” were not always detected while
the destroyers’ consumption rate
left “little margin for unforeseen
contingencies.”36
The force sent to the Arctic
in 1948 was a relatively large
one by Canadian standards, but
unfortunately the RCN could not
afford to repeat this powerful
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4

expression of sovereignty during
the following year. Instead, they
settled for three smaller deployments.
The voyage of the frigate HMCS
Swansea, which travelled from
H a l i f a x t o F r o b i s h e r Ba y a n d
Godthaab, Greenland, between 24
August and 20 September 1949, was
particularly important because it
represented an attempt to continue
an independent RCN presence in the
north. Tasked with the same scientific
explorations, familiarisation and
training work started by the previous
year’s cruise, Swansea’s experience
was unsurprisingly similar those
of Nootka and Haida. Nevertheless,
an incident at the American base
on Padloping Island underscored
the need for a Canadian naval
presence in the Arctic. “The NCOin-charge stated that some of his men
were wondering why a Canadian
Warship was in these waters,” wrote
Swansea’s CO: “It was pointed out in
a friendly but firm manner that this
was not unreasonable since this was
Canada.”37
The participation of HMCS
Cedarwood and HMCS Haida in two
separate joint ventures with the
Americans did little to raise the RCN’s
profile in the region. 38 In fact, Haida’s
involvement in Exercise Noramex
demonstrated how the RCN’s limited
resources left Canada with little
choice but to rely on the USN to
help defend its North. Designed
to prevent an enemy force from
turning a Labrador weather station
into an airstrip, the 33 American
ships and 3,500 marines dwarfed the
lone Canadian destroyer assigned to
the exercise. The RCN had wanted
to provide additional forces, but
operational commitments elsewhere
prevented them from doing so.
The dream of sending Canadian
destroyers and frigates on yearly
cruises to the North had already come
to an end, but things only got worse in
1950. 39 Further manning reductions
and anti-submarine requirements in
the Atlantic and Pacific were making

it hard for the RCN to join Noramex
II, but just as they had done over the
past four years the Naval Board was
willing to go to extreme lengths to
scavenge personnel to man Nootka
for this particular exercise. It was all
for naught as once again operational
factors (this time the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea) placed these
Arctic ambitions on the backburner.40
The RCN would not return to
the Arctic until HMCS Labrador, the
Navy’s new icebreaker, sailed into
these waters in the summer of 1954,
and this long gap would suggest that
the RCN’s capabilities did not match
the large operational significance
the service attached to the region.
In reality, the 1948 Northern Cruise
represented the type of presence
that the RCN wanted regularly to
maintain in the Arctic during the
summer months. Unfortunately,
those ambitions could not be realized
in the face of budget cuts, manning
shortages, existing operational
commitments, and ship limitations,
as well as restrictions imposed by
logistical and fuelling constraints.
But one thing was clear: the Navy’s
desire to work in the North between
1946 and 1950 was there even if the
resources were not.

Notes
1. The title for this article is taken from
a Report of Proceeding [ROP] from
HMCS Nootka, Directorate of History
and Heritage [DHH], 81/520/8000, Box
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the postwar naval team led by Mike
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integrating concept team at Chief of
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defence issues related to the Canadian
North helped with the development of
this article.
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Canada [LAC], Record Group 24 [RG
24], Vol. 4027, file 1062-13-22. Michael
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information see W.A.B. Douglas, “The
Nazi Weather Station in Labrador,”
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the significance of a US Arctic endeavour
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